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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



JCSM-360-63  
10 May 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

**Subject: Courses of Action Related to Cuba (U)**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the courses of action that might be taken by the United States in the event of a spontaneous revolt in Cuba. They are of the opinion that the discussion in the Enclosure attached hereto would be useful to you in your capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

**For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

**Signed**

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Attachment**

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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (U)

Consisting of the Enclosure - 18 Pages

Appendix A - 3 Pages

Appendix B - 2 Pages

Appendix C - 4 Pages

Appendix D - 5 Pages

Annex - 3 Pages

Appendix E - 3 Pages

Appendix F - 1 Page

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Enclosure

ENCLOSURE  
DISCUSSION

1. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a comprehensive study of the courses of action which might be taken if a spontaneous revolt occurred in Cuba. It includes consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.

2. A summary of this study is included in paragraphs 16 to 23.

INTRODUCTION

3. Definition of a Revolt. For the purpose of this study, a revolt is considered to be an overt uprising in Cuba, characterized by open defiance and armed resistance with objective of supplanting the Castro communist regime.

4. Basic Assumptions. Throughout the study it will be assumed that:

a. Overt military conflict between the United States and its allies with the Sino-Soviet Bloc has not yet begun.

b. Sino-Soviet support continues to strengthen the Castro communist regime through contribution of moral, political, economic, and military assistance.

c. US policy and objectives are the supplanting of the Castro communist regime and the elimination of the threat to US security posed by the Soviet military presence in Cuba and a Cuban regime hostile to the United States.

d. US incitement of anti-Castro activities remains at the present level of US effort.

5. Intelligence Appraisal. The US intelligence community indicates it is considered that

6. Possible Forms and Circumstances of a Spontaneous Revolt.

There are several situations which are potential sources of a spontaneous uprising.

a. For some time there have been shortages of consumer goods which have resulted in strict rationing. Such shortages are expected to continue. If the rationing becomes too severe, or widespread favoritism is disclosed, spontaneous but scattered uprisings might occur and spread rapidly. Considerable public support probably could be generated for such a cause. However, the revolt probably would suffer from a lack of coordinated leadership, unless the United States intervenes in a timely and adequate manner, and probably could be quelled by the internal security forces.

b. The small resistance elements presently operating in various parts of the island are potential sources of revolt.

(1) A single point insurrection could occur with anti-Castro elements seizing a town such as Cienfuegos, or a mountain redoubt. (See Appendix F.)

(2) Because of geographical configuration of the island, together with its central highway system, the most likely places in Cuba where revolutionary groups could hold out against concerted attack by forces available to Castro for at least a week are the four mountain ranges - Escambray in Las Villas Province, the Organos Range in Pinar del Rio Province, the Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province, and the mountain range stretching from Mayari Arriba in Oriente Province to the southwest along the coast and east to the coastal city of Bayamo. The

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d. US incitement of anti-Castro activities remains at the present level of US effort.

5. Intelligence Appraisal. The US intelligence community indicates it is considered not likely that a spontaneous, widespread, effective revolt will occur in the near future. For an analysis of the capabilities of enemy forces and anti-Castro activities, see Appendix A (Appraisal of the Enemy) and Appendix B (Appraisal of Anti-Castro Revolutionary Activity).

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[REDACTED]

by substantial forces, they could last a longer period of time. It would be advantageous, in this case, for groups to be infiltrated clandestinely as feasible, in order to conceal the scope of their presence. However, it is emphasized that vulnerability to detection and destruction by Castro's internal security forces increases in proportion to the size of revolutionary guerrilla forces.

(3) Although Castro originally gained power from a guerrilla beginning, the present situation in Cuba is vastly different from the waning days of the Batista regime. The Cuban internal security forces are much larger, better organized, and possess considerably more mobility than in the past. Organization and supply of large resistance groups probably would be quickly detected by the regime.

c. A third potential source of revolution could be a power struggle between the "old" Communists and the "new" Communists for control of Cuba. However, at the present time, relations between these two groups do not appear to be overly strained. Moreover, US assistance to either side certainly would not be welcome, nor would US support to either side accomplish US objectives.

d. There is a slight possibility of a palace revolution by disaffected 26th of July elements against Castro elements in Havana and provincial capitals. These would be hard-to-identify antagonists fighting at close quarters. The leadership of the Cuban military establishment almost certainly remains loyal to the Castro brothers. However, except for several elite military units especially

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with the aim of overthrowing the Communist government. Large-scale defections would probably not take place until there was tangible evidence of a US military presence in Cuba.

e. An uprising could be sparked by an insurrectionary attack against the Soviet troops or by a move by the Soviet troops to support hard-line communists in any one of the foregoing situations.

In any spontaneous uprising in Cuba, it is almost certain that its leaders, supported by important sectors of Latin American opinion, will request US assistance. The United States, because of recent public statements by national leaders, will be subjected to political and moral pressures, both international and domestic, to intervene.

#### COURSES OF ACTION

7. Major Courses of Action. If a revolt should happen spontaneously, the United States would be faced with four major and obvious options: to ignore the revolt, to discourage it, to encourage it, or actively to support it.

#### 8. To Ignore the Revolt

a. Ignoring a genuine revolt underway in Cuba would cause great damage to the international position and prestige of the United States. It would be inconsistent with the many official US public statements. It would injure Cuban morale seriously causing them to become more resigned to their fate. It could occasion almost irreparable harm by shattering the image of the United States as a leader and champion of freedom, not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in the Government with

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until there was tangible evidence of a US military presence in Cuba.

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b. In the past, Castro's forces promptly have suppressed the slightest indications of popular unrest. In several instances, anti-regime plots have been unearthed long before they matured. It would appear that efforts to launch a revolt would have little chance of success without help or control from external sources.

c. Historically, the Russians have always exploited successes to the maximum. A lack of a firm US stand might encourage the Russians to participate directly in the suppression of an uprising, even though not needed by Castro's forces, as an object lesson to future target countries of communism in the American continents. Moreover, the image of a United States not too concerned about a revolt, and apparently co-existing with communism in Cuba, could tempt the Soviets to gamble on the undertaking of an open expansion of their subversive operations in other parts of Latin America.

d. On the other hand, non-interference in a Cuban rebellion would avoid disruption of any then current negotiations between the United States and the communists. It would preclude world criticism that the United States deliberately tried to precipitate another crisis that could lead to general war.

e. Failure to exploit any opportunity to rid the Western Hemisphere of a communist state would be contrary to the best interest of the United States.

#### 9. To Discourage the Revolt

a. Since the alleged withdrawal of some of the Soviet troops, which began in February 1963, appears largely to have been

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discourage any potential revolt because of possible interference with US-Soviet negotiations. As a matter of fact, there are sufficient Soviet troops in Cuba to cause them to be a subject of discussion for some time to come. Otherwise, however, attempting to discourage a revolt would be difficult to do and would have most of the same unfortunate effects as ignoring it. A possible benefit that the United States could obtain by discouraging a revolt openly, before or after it got started, would be that of a doubtful and transient propaganda nature in the forums of the OAS and the UN. This would disturb the current Cuban regime but little.

b. If it is to be the policy of the United States not to support any revolt, then measures should be taken now to discourage such action before it gets started. This should be done as quietly and discreetly as possible, to preclude total discouragement of Cubans, both within Cuba and in exile, who desire to liberate their country. It should be done indirectly so that the United States could maintain a flexibility for future actions as well as keep the opposition guessing as to the true US intentions. Active and passive measures of resistance should be kept in low key, to avoid increasing pressure to such an unbearable extent that Castro and the communists in Cuba would inflict severe reprisals. Such reprisals would not only destroy valuable human and material assets for future operations but might trigger off a revolt that would have a serious threat

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10. To encourage but not support a non-US initiated revolt  
The United States could respond by giving verbal approval and moral encouragement but not otherwise supporting the revolt.

a. To encourage the revolt without actively supporting it, the State Department could focus attention upon the violation in Cuba by stimulating various international commissions and forums to consider the violation of human rights by the Castro regime. It could instruct Country Teams in the Western Hemisphere to stimulate expressions of sympathy for the revolt from as many sectors as possible in the host country. It also could issue Departmental statements as appropriate, emphasizing the struggle of the dissidents against overwhelming odds, and publicly warn the Soviets to keep out of the situation.

b. Should a widespread anti-Castro movement not materialize, the United States Government could seek to derive as much political and propaganda advantage as possible from the forcible suppression of the revolt by the Castro regime. It is considered that this course of action would have the same unfortunate results as either ignoring or discouraging the revolt.


11. To support a non-US initiated revolt

a. It is unlikely that a major uprising will occur all at once and without notice. Most likely it would evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert, and military preparations to include activating the JUWTF.

b. However, rumors are...

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c. Clandestine intelligence collection in Cuba is currently extremely slow and limited. The United States Government is unlikely, therefore, to be able to arrive at an early reliable appraisal of any revolt until it already has achieved considerable success or has failed - unless there had been communications links established with the resistance forces.



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b. However, rumors or reports that anti-Castro forces within Cuba plan to launch an all-out attack against the regime could represent an attempt by Castro to trap his opponents. He has used these tactics before with considerable success. As a result, the United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a genuine rebellion is imminent before its actual outbreak.

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[REDACTED]

g. As soon as the situation warrants after a Presidential decision to support a spontaneous revolt in Cuba, the United States Government should request a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, under Article 39 of the Organization of American States (OAS) charter, "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States." This meeting would recommend measures commensurate with the nature of the situation, and in the event of Soviet intervention while in session, could rapidly adjourn and be reconvened as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty.

h. Following the establishment of US military control of the island, the United States must be prepared to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum created by the downfall of the Castro communist rule of Cuba. In this regard, the development and recognition of a Cuban political organization is desirable. The United States should initiate action now, prior to

[REDACTED]

This, in turn, could

lead to supplanting the Castro communist government with one whose methods and aims are more nearly compatible with those of the United States. A successful revolt would offer the opportunity to eliminate a major political and psychological lodgment and potential military base that international communism has effected in the Western Hemisphere. It would terminate Cuba's role as a direct transit link between the Bloc and Latin America. An increasingly serious threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere would have been removed.

j. On the other hand, intervention could pose some major difficulties. It could result in a direct confrontation of US forces with Soviet forces in Cuba. (See paragraph 12.) The Soviets could respond with action elsewhere around the world if the United States supported a revolt in Cuba. It is possible that some Latin American countries might react unfavorably, at least initially, to US intervention. However, the unfortunate results of not actively supporting an uprising appear to outweigh this disadvantage. (See paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.)

k. In light of the foregoing, it is believed that, as a matter of policy, the United States should be prepared to support any spontaneous revolt in Cuba showing reasonable promise of success.

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h. Following the establishment of US military control of the island, the United States must be prepared to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum created by the downfall of the Castro communist rule of Cuba. In this regard, the development and recognition of a Cuban political organization is desirable. The United States should initiate action now, prior to any revolt, to organize and coalesce the many Cuban factions. The potential leaders most likely to gain the widest Cuban support, and best suited to US interest, should be identified and encouraged to assume active leadership roles, thus providing a nucleus for a government that can be established quickly on Cuban soil.

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## SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

12. The Soviets

b. Nevertheless, the US response, as stated above, must be a rapid application of military force. Because of the possibility of a confrontation with Soviet forces, plans being developed to implement this course of action should consider

(1) Political. A firm and continuing political pressure should be maintained to remove all Soviet troops from Cuba as soon as possible. The large numbers of skilled Soviet troops and technicians, not to mention those also present from other Bloc nations, provide a professional training base that daily continues to develop competent Castro military forces. The Soviet personnel provide a means of indoctrination of the large mass of Cuban people in communist doctrine. By their presence, the Soviets could strengthen

(2) Unconventional Warfare (UW). Prior to or in conjunction with US military operations, or as a substitute for conventional attacks against them, the Soviet threat could be reduced significantly or rendered ineffective




(3) Military. The air plan directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could well be the difference between the success or failure of any popular uprising. In conjunction with the air strikes, the following actions could be considered:

(a) First, a reasonable time before the execution of the air plan (long enough for rapid decision by the Kremlin), it would be announced publicly that the United States intended to attack only the troops and installations of the Cuban regime, and, that according to the Soviets themselves, all Cuban anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands.\* It would not attack the Soviet personnel or camps, provided they remained passive. Any hostile action would result in a US attack on that particular camp, installation, or the offending concentration of personnel. Consideration could be given to identifying the known Soviet

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USUN telegram to State, No. 1581, 11 P.M., 31 October 1962




major disadvantage of alerting the Castro/Soviet forces. It eliminates the possibility of a surprise attack. It would allow the enemy to prepare for the attack and the Soviets to employ political or military countermeasures.

(b) A second alternative is to conduct the planned air strikes first and then afterwards announce a "stand-fast, no fire, mark position" policy.

(c) A third alternative could be used in combination with either of the two. In conjunction with the public announcement that the US intentions were to attack only hostile Cubans, the announcement would declare Havana an open city, establishing corridors of safety by which personnel in the open, travelling by day, could move to designated safe havens without fear of US attack. The United States, in possession of air superiority, would guarantee safe conduct under the Rules of War. This would allow friendly Cubans and non-Cubans to disengage from military operations. The Soviets could move their technicians, advisors, and other personnel, without losing face. A likely major disadvantage to this third course of action would be that the safe conduct could be abused and the United States would be unable to enforce its pledge of a guaranteed safe conduct. There is some Soviet-Cuban antagonism at present and the Castro forces as well as the revolutionaries could engage the Soviets in the safe corridors. It is possible that the Castro forces, poorly equipped Cuban

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casualties and damage, imagined or actually suffered, in the initial strikes, whether or not they accept the proposition of safe conduct and safe haven. In any event the United States would have grounds on which to justify its actions in the world community or international forums as the necessity arose. This is also true in declaring Havana an open city. To keep Castro communist forces busy and diverted, the Cuban population would be incited to conduct demonstrations, strikes, riot, and street fighting until after the United States has seized control of the rest of the island. Cubans in the revolutionary movement could move in and take over the control of the city at the appropriate time.



(e) Surprise air strikes against Cuban targets, with prior neutralization of Soviet concentrations and installations by political or UW operations, would be the appropriate action. Following the initial air strikes, Havana could be declared an open city. Any hostile action by Soviet troops in Cuba would bring immediate implementation of prepared OPLANS.


13. Training of Selected Cuban Nationals. It is considered expedient to identify US action in Cuba as closely as possible with the aspirations of the Cuban people, and to exploit the military potential of the Cuban exiles in the United States.

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
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13. Training of Selected Cuban Nationals. It is considered expedient to identify US action in Cuba as closely as possible with the aspirations of the Cuban people, and to exploit the military potential of the Cuban exiles in the United States.




The United States should use the Cuban expatriates in covert support of a Cuban revolt. It would seem particularly desirable in overt operations to employ militarily trained Cuban nationals integrated with US units. For details, see Appendix C hereto --(Training of Cuban Nationals).

14. Capabilities of US Forces. A summary of the capabilities of US Forces to support anti-Castro revolutionary activity is contained in Appendix E hereto (Capabilities of US Forces to Give Military Support to Anti-Castro Revolutionary Activities).



15. Internal Intelligence

a. The clandestine intelligence process involving Cuba is extremely slow and limited. According to CINCLANT, accurate, detailed, and continually updated intelligence of the general attitude and morale of the Cuban military and civilian populace is lacking.




#### SUMMARY

16. This study examined four alternatives open to the United States with respect to a spontaneous Cuban revolution: (1) to ignore, (2) to discourage, (3) to encourage, and (4) to actively support a spontaneous revolt. Special consideration was given to the presence of Soviet troops, the role of Cuban expatriates, US military capabilities, and internal intelligence.

17. Study of the four broad courses of US action in the event of an unexpected Cuban revolution leads to the conclusions that:


a. Widespread effective revolt

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17. Study of the four broad courses of US action in the event of an unexpected Cuban revolution leads to the conclusions that:

- a. Widespread effective revolt is not likely at this time.

- b. Potential sources of spontaneous uprising exist.
- c. Favorably situated revolutionists could survive up to a week without external aid.
- d. The US could support such revolt;

18. Soviet Military. The presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba increases the pressure on the United States to intervene if Soviet personnel are used to suppress a spontaneous revolt, and could draw the United States into direct confrontation with the Soviets in the event of US intervention.

21. US Capabilities. The precise conditions that would attend a substantial uprising against Castro cannot be foreseen. It might prove undesirable, under some circumstances,

22. Planning. Plans should be completed prior to any revolt to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum that would be caused in Cuba by the downfall of the Castro communist regime. Action should be initiated now to organize and coalesce the many Cuban factions and to provide policy guidance for conduct of psychological operations to include objectives and themes.

23. Major Conclusions.

a. The United States Government should be prepared to exploit any revolution in Cuba showing reasonable promise of success.

b. Assuming that such a revolt were truly spontaneous; i.e., that it occurred without a considerable degree of US incitement and collaboration, we would be hampered greatly in providing effective support of the revolt

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
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## APPENDIX A

## APPRAISAL OF THE ENEMY

1. At the time of the Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961, the island was defended by an untrained, poorly equipped Cuban Army. No significant Soviet forces were present and an integrated air defense system did not exist.

2. In contrast, today Cuba is defended by a relatively well-trained Cuban Army and by a significant Soviet force equipped with weapons with a nuclear potential and modern tanks. An integrated Soviet/Cuban-manned air defense system now exists. There is also a strong civilian control organization with a significant counterinsurgency capability.

3. The enemy forces are composed of the Cuban Ground, Navy and Air Force forces and, more than likely, the Soviet forces in Cuba.

a. The Cuban Ground Forces include a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000 and a militia of 100,000. The Cuban Navy has a strength of 4,000-5,000 personnel. The Cuban Air Force has about 3,000. The Army's ready reserves are capable of quick mobilization. The Cuban Navy and Air Force have no reserves.

b. There are sufficient arms and ammunition in Cuba to satisfy the foreseeable needs of the Cuban Armed Forces. Although Cuban supply procedures are not especially efficient, there are enough supplies on hand to cope with any internally generated resistance. Fuel supplies on hand would last about three months, if conserved by a strict rationing program. Sufficient transportation is available to move combat forces to meet most anticipated resistance threats. The some 60 HOUND helicopters in the Cuban Air Force inventory furnish a significant capability for moving troops quickly into relatively

4. In view of the foregoing, it is believed that the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces are as follows. Although the home-guard militia units have no significant combat capability, the Cuban Ground Forces probably are well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of a large-scale US military invasion, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be able or likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. The battalion combat team is the basic tactical unit. The Cuban Air Force has the capability to carry out air-to-ground strikes against guerrilla forces and also has the ability to transport troops quickly to areas of insurrection.

5. Currently it is estimated that strength of the Soviet forces in Cuba is about 17,000. There are military personnel from other Bloc countries present also, in unknown numbers. There is no information available upon which an appraisal of Soviet reactions to a Cuban revolt can be made. However, it is believed the Soviets would support to the fullest extent any movement which would preserve or improve Moscow's position in Cuba. In most situations, the Soviets probably would delay intervening in order to allow the Castro regime time to suppress the revolt with its own forces. However, if the regime appeared to be in danger of collapsing, the Soviets probably would intervene in order to preserve the communist stake in Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

6. At present, the regime's security and military forces evidently are maintaining a high degree of vigilance, which may be attributed at least partially to the recent increase in activity by anti-Castro dissidents.

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6. At present, the regime's security and military forces evidently are maintaining a high degree of vigilance, which may be attributed at least partially to the recent increase in activity by anti-Castro dissidents. It is possible that the Cuban and Soviet forces will make increased use of measures to thwart US photo reconnaissance in Cuba. About twenty percent

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of the island population actively supports the Castro regime. Most of the Cuban people remain apathetic to Castro. The Cuban military establishment continues seemingly loyal to Castro and yet there are no indications of any significant disaffections. In general, Castro's internal security apparatus continues to improve. The Castro communists have leadership, military experience in guerrilla warfare, emergency mobilization and counter-insurgency operations, and an adequate supply of arms and ammunition to bring against their enemies.

#### 7. Political Prisoners

a. The political prisoners convicted of the most serious crimes against the state are mainly confined in a maximum security prison on the Isle of Pines. This installation and other political prisons are reportedly slated for demolition with prepositioned explosives, should an invasion take place. Freeing the prisoners on the Isle of Pines would not be of significant benefit, because they still would have to reach the main island to become of subversive use. In addition, these prisoners would possess little intelligence information because of their isolation from Cuban life. All Bay of Pigs prisoners were released by the Cuban Government and they now live in exile in the United States.

b. American Prisoners. Recent private negotiations were successful in obtaining the release of a group of US citizens from Cuban jails. However, others could be seized and confined in the future. If negotiations to release them were unsuccessful, US military action against Cuba could result in reprisals against these prisoners.

8. Negotiations. Concerning the release of American prisoners and withdrawal of Soviet troops, it should be borne in mind that negotiations on those matters could

are forces or groups which are

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## APPENDIX B

## APPRAISAL OF ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

1. Among the approximately 160,000 Cuban exiles in the United States, there are seven principal anti-communist organizations, with a total of about 5,000 members, with an additional 6,000 members in Cuba.\* There are at least 50 secondary organizations and over 300 minor anti-communist groups in the United States and Cuba. Some small groups are already organized and trained in guerrilla warfare. Within Cuba, anti-communist groups are mostly inactive, due to lack of communications and lack of opportunity to rise up because of the very efficient police state supported country wide by the 300-000 Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Most of the Cuban people, although apathetic toward Castro, are also unlikely to support any resistance movement until its changes of success virtually are guaranteed.
2. There remains the possibility that increasing political and economic tensions within the island might result in an uprising among the more impatient and volatile of the Cubans. Despite the boasts of the Castro regime extolling the virtues of the revolution, the standard of living has declined. Shortages of consumer goods continue to plague the regime. A growing political disenchantment with the Castro regime has been manifested in a wide-spread incidence of worker apathy, absenteeism and lack of cooperation, and in an advent of passive resistance. Castro's most urgent problem, in the

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\* Principal organizations:

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8. Negotiations. Concerning the release of American prisoners and withdrawal of Soviet troops, it should be borne in mind that negotiations on those matters could be prolonged over a period of time. Again, even if any Americans in prison were released, others could be seized at will and confined. Sufficient Soviet troops are present in Cuba to cause them to be a subject of discussion for some time to come.

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\* Principal organizations:

30 November Revolutionary Movement (NRTN)  
Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR)  
Revolutionary Unity (UR)  
Student's Revolutionary Directorate (DRE)  
Revolutionary Democratic Rescue (RDR)  
Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP)  
Christian Democratic Movement (MRC)



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form of aggravated popular unrest, will arise if any substantial cuts are made in the volume of food-stuffs delivered to Cuba.

## APPENDIX C

## TRAINING OF CUBAN NATIONALS

1. Current Policy. The present policy of the United States is to train Cuban nationals as individuals capable of serving in an emergency as members of the armed forces of the United States. On 8 February 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved military training for the members of the 2506th Cuban Brigade on a similar basis.

2. Current Program. The military departments have been conducting a training program for Cuban expatriates for the past several months. There were in training as of February 1963, approximately 2,600 Cuban nationals, all of whom were volunteers. This program:

a. Is being conducted within current manpower and funding ceilings.

b. Will cost approximately \$8,000,000 when completed.

c. Qualifies the trainee only in basic military skills. Each Cuban in the program may volunteer for additional specialized training, such as parachute qualification, and/or elect to remain on active duty. If he chooses active duty, he will be assigned to duty with US units in accordance with his military occupational specialty. No purely Cuban units will be formed.

d. Is more likely to produce volunteers for specialized training than any other. At present, the indications are that the majority of trainees will elect to revert to the inactive reserve at the earliest possible date.

e. Has not proved to be popular among Cuban exiles in general.

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3. Use of Cubans from Present Program. Cuban nationals trained under this program could be called to active duty in an emergency and integrated with US units. Their usefulness will be limited. Besides using their basic military skills, they could serve as interpreters, but the utility of some would be limited by their command of English. They could serve as guides, providing they were employed in a familiar area. They could be used for liaison contacts with the populace. In this liaison role, the effectiveness of some would be limited by their command of English, and their acceptability to the populace. Possessing only rudimentary military training, however, these individuals cannot be integrated satisfactorily with special units without considerable additional training. Further, each trainee constitutes a distinct security risk, which may preclude some of them from receiving classified types of additional training.

4. Organization of Cuban Conventional Units. With Cuban nationals who have satisfactorily completed basic military training in the US Armed Forces Reserve, the United States could organize a small all-Cuban conventional force, probably no larger than a brigade. Primary difficulties to be overcome would be these.

a. Security risks involved in bringing together Cubans as a group. Undoubtedly Castro's agents could penetrate the unit, or, at least, Castro agents among the exile groups will be well informed concerning the formation of the unit or its state of training.

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7. DOD Use of Cubans in Support of Revolt. In a letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 March 1963, CINCLANT pointed out that the Cuban expatriates' "greatest potential is related to those military roles for which the Army has responsibility," and urged training them for UW. Although having Cuban nationals available for deployment in a UW role would enhance, to some degree, the capability of supporting an uprising, grave political and security risks overshadow this limited capability. Furthermore, the present requirement to include Cuban volunteers within the personnel ceiling of the US Army makes any substantial program unattractive. For the present, no US Army program is pointed toward Cuban participation in UW; Cubans will participate in military operations only as individuals in US units.

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## APPENDIX D

## PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS\*


1. General


a. Paramilitary forces\*\* are forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. A paramilitary operation\*\* is an operation undertaken by a paramilitary force. A covert operation,\*\* in part, is one planned and executed so as to conceal the identity of the sponsor. A clandestine operation\*\* is one in which the operation itself is concealed.




Army Special

Forces are uniformed overt forces capable of infiltrating enemy or potential enemy territory by airdrop or by other means. Their primary function is the organization and control of indigenous guerrilla forces.




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b. NSAM 162 restated the above paragraph, and further directed that the Department of Defense increase its capability to fund, support, and conduct wholly or partially covert paramilitary operations under the criteria of NSAM 57.




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
\* Includes unconventional warfare operations  
\*\* JCS Pub 1

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3. Conduct of UW Operations.



d. The Cuban/Soviet defenses and counterinsurgency capability presently in Cuba are such that a successful uprising without US overt support is impractical. The numbers of Cuban exile forces required would approximate the force requirements contained in current US plans. Forces in the size of two to five divisions are not available from free Cuban sources. An operation of this magnitude, using Cuban forces alone, is too costly and unrealistic to warrant further

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


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4. Improvement of Unconventional Warfare capability could encompass the following actions:



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
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ANNEX TO APPENDIX D

STOCKS OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR A UW OPERATION

1. Organic equipment is now available for all Special Forces assigned to JUWTF. Army Special Forces and their equipment are located at Fort Bragg, N.C. Navy Special Forces and their equipment are located at Norfolk, Virginia. Air Force Special Forces and their equipment are located at Eglin Field, Florida.






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[REDACTED] The experience

of JMWTF during the Cuban crisis indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. A logistical arrangement must be designed specifically to support the buildup of an indigenous force engaged in guerrilla operations.


[REDACTED]

An additional stock of equipment and supplies, in an unpacked configuration, might be required at an assembly and storage depot in the Southeastern US. Subdepots would stock reserve supplies and equipment, ready for movement to the assembly depot as required. As envisaged, this system would be separate from the normal Army supply procedures. As its prime purpose, it would provide for the rapid production at one conveniently located Army depot

[REDACTED]

b. Provisions would be made for an initial issue prepack, and a resupply prepack.

[REDACTED]

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5. Prestockage as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs could enhance readiness. If the operation will permit our assuming the risk of attributable equipment, the Army plans may provide for more flexible and comprehensive logistic support. However, the expense of the measure is patent. Additionally, the storage of non-compatible items of ordnance poses problems, as does inspection and maintenance of the equipment and parachutes. Nonetheless, prompt logistic support may be one of the first, and most effective means by which the US can directly aid a revolt in Cuba.. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equipment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.

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APPENDIX E

CAPABILITIES OF US FORCES TO GIVE MILITARY SUPPORT  
TO ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES (S)

1. The purpose of this annex is to summarize US capabilities to support a spontaneous uprising in Cuba in the near future, and to indicate the preliminary actions which could be taken to improve US immediate capabilities should current analysis by the intelligence community indicate that such revolutionary activity is, in fact, probable.

2. US basic capabilities for action in Cuba from normal deployment posture are as follows (times are from decision to action), the United States:

3. It is assumed that in the early phases of an uprising in Cuba, Cuban and Soviet forces would be able to retain control over principal military installations, including air defense missile sites. This capability might hamper large-scale aircraft operations to revolutionary elements to an unacceptable


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1. The purpose of this annex is to summarize US capabilities to support a spontaneous uprising in Cuba in the near future, and to indicate the preliminary actions which could be taken to improve US immediate capabilities should current analysis by the intelligence community indicate that such revolutionary activity is, in fact, probable.

2. US basic capabilities for action in Cuba from normal deployment posture are as follows (times are from decision to action), the United States:



3. It is assumed that in the early phases of an uprising in Cuba, Cuban and Soviet forces would be able to retain control over principal military installations, including air defense missile sites. This capability might hamper large-scale aircraft operations to revolutionary elements to an unacceptable degree. Therefore, an early feature of active operations against Cuba would be the initiation of air strikes to eliminate the effective capability of the air defense system.

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